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While there are many opinions on what mathematical modeling in biology is, in essence,
modeling is a mathematical tool, like a microscope, which allows consequences to
logically follow from a set of assumptions. Only when this tool is applied appropriately,
as microscope is used to look at small items, it may allow to understand importance
of specific mechanisms/assumptions in biological processes. Mathematical modeling
can be less useful or even misleading if used inappropriately, for example, when a
microscope is used to study stars. According to some philosophers (Oreskes et al.,
1994), the best use of mathematical models is not when a model is used to confirm
a hypothesis but rather when a model shows inconsistency of the model (defined by
a specific set of assumptions) and data. Following the principle of strong inference
for experimental sciences proposed by Platt (1964), I suggest “strong inference in
mathematical modeling” as an effective and robust way of using mathematical modeling
to understand mechanisms driving dynamics of biological systems. The major steps
of strong inference in mathematical modeling are (1) to develop multiple alternative
models for the phenomenon in question; (2) to compare the models with available
experimental data and to determine which of the models are not consistent with
the data; (3) to determine reasons why rejected models failed to explain the data,
and (4) to suggest experiments which would allow to discriminate between remaining
alternative models. The use of strong inference is likely to provide better robustness
of predictions of mathematical models and it should be strongly encouraged in
mathematical modeling-based publications in the Twenty-First century.
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1. THE CORE OF MATHEMATICAL MODELING
What is the use of mathematical modeling in biology? The answer likely depends on the
background of the responder as mathematicians or physicists may have a different answer than
biologists, and the answer may also depend on the researcher’s definition of a “model.” In some
cases models are useful for estimation of parameters underlying biological processes when such
parameters are not directly measurable. For example, by measuring the number of T lymphocytes
over time and by utilizing a simple model, assuming exponential growth, we can estimate the
rate of expansion of T cell populations (De Boer et al., 2001). In other cases, making the model
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may help think more carefully about contribution of multiple
players and their interactions in the observed phenomenon.
In general, however, mathematical models are most useful
when they provide important insights into underlying biological
mechanisms. In this opinion article, I would to provide
my personal thoughts on the current state and future of
mathematical modeling in biology with the focus on the
dynamics of infectious diseases. As a disclosure I must admit
that I am taking an extreme, provocative view, based on personal
experience as a reader and a reviewer. I hope that this work
will generate the much needed discussion on uses and misuses
of mathematical models in biology and perhaps will result in
quantitative data on this topic.
In my experience, in the area of dynamical systems/models
of the within-host and between-host dynamics of infectious
diseases, the two most commonly given answers to the question
of the “use of mathematical models” are (1) models help us
understand biology better; and (2) models help us predict the
impact of interventions (e.g., gene knockouts/knockins, cell
depletions, vaccines, treatments) on the population dynamics.
Although there is some truth to these answers the way
mathematical modeling in biology is generally taught and applied
rarely allows one to better understand biology. In some cases
mathematical models generate predictions which are difficult or
impossible to test, the latter making such models unscientific
per the definition of a scientific theory according to one of the
major philosophers of science in the Twentieth Century Karl
Popper (Popper, 2002). Moreover, mathematical modeling may
result in questionable recommendations for public health-related
policies. My main thesis is that while, in my experience, much
of current research in mathematical biology is aimed at finding
the right model for a given biological system, we should pay
more attention to understanding which biologically reasonable
models do not work, i.e., are not able to describe the biological
phenomenon in question. According to Karl Popper, proving
a given hypothesis to be correct is impossible while rejecting
hypotheses is feasible (Oreskes et al., 1994; Popper, 2002).
What is a mathematical model? In essence, mathematical
model is a hypothesis regarding a phenomenon in question.
While any specific model always has an underlying hypothesis
(or in some cases, a set of hypotheses), the converse is not
true as multiple mathematical models could be formulated for a
given hypothesis. In this essay I will use words “hypothesis” and
“model” interchangeably. The core of a mathematical model is
the set of model assumptions. These assumptions could be based
on some experimental observations or simply be a logical thought
based on everyday experience. For example, for an ordinary
differential equation (ODE)-based model, the assumptions are
the formulated equations which include functional terms of
interactions between species in the model, parameters associated
with these functions, and initial conditions of the model. The
utility of mathematics lies in our ability to logically follow from
the assumptions to conclusions on the system’s dynamics. Thus,
mathematical modeling is a logical path from a set of assumptions
to conclusions. Such a logical path from axioms to theorems was
termed by some as a mathematical revolution in the Twentieth
Century (Quinn, 2012). However, while in mathematics it is
vital to formulate a complete set of axioms/assumptions to
establish verifiable, true statements such as theorems (Quinn,
2012), a complete set of assumptions is impossible in any biology-
based mathematical model due to the openness of biological
systems (or any other natural system, Oreskes et al., 1994).
Therefore, biological conclusions stemming from analysis of
mathematical models are inherently incomplete and are in
general strongly dependent on the assumptions of the model
(De Boer, 2012). While such dependency of model conclusions
on model assumptions may be viewed as a weakness but it is
instead the most significant strength of mathematical modeling!
By varying model assumptions one can vary model predictions
and subsequently by comparing predictions to experimental
observations, sets of assumptions which generate predictions
consistent and inconsistent with the data can be identified.
This is the core of mathematical modeling which can provide
profound insights into biological processes. While it is often
possible to provide mechanistic explanations for some biological
phenomena from intuition—and many biologists do it—it is
often hard to identify sets of implicit assumptions made during
such a verbal process. Mathematical modeling by requiring
one to define the model specifies such assumptions explicitly.
Inherent to this interpretation of mathematical modeling is the
need to consider multiple sets of assumptions (or models) to
determine which are consistent and, more importantly, which
are not consistent with experimental observations. Rather than
a thorough expedition to test multiple alternative models, in my
experience as a reader and a reviewer many studies utilizing
mathematical modeling in biology have been a quest to find (and
analyze) a single “correct” model.
I would argue that studies in which a single model was
considered and in which the developed model was not rigorously
tested against experimental data, do not provide robust biological
insights (see below). Pure mathematical analysis of the model
and its behavior (e.g., often performed steady state stability
analyses for ODE-based models) often provides little insight
into the mechanisms driving dynamics in specific biological
systems. Failure to consider alternative models often results in
biased interpretation of biological observations. Let me give two
examples.
Discussion of predator-prey interactions in ecology often
starts with the Lotka-Volterra model which is built on very
simple and yet powerful basic assumptions (Mooney and Swift,
1999; Kot, 2001). The dynamics of the model can be understood
analytically and predictions on the dynamics of predator and
prey abundances can be easily generated. The observation
of the hares and lynx dynamics in Canada has been often
presented as evidence that predator-prey interactions driven
the dynamics of this biological system (Mooney and Swift,
1999). While it is possible that the dynamics was driven by
predator-prey interactions, recent studies also suggest that the
dynamics could be driven by self-regulating factors and weather
activities influencing independently each of the species (Brauer
and Castillo-Chávez, 2001; Zhang et al., 2007). A more robust
modeling approach would be to start with observations of
lynx and hare dynamics and ask about biological mechanisms
which could be driving such dynamics including predator-prey
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interactions, seasonality, or both (Hilborn and Mangel, 1997).
The data can then be used to test which of these sets of
assumptions is more consistent with experimental data using
standard model selection tools (Burnham and Anderson, 2002).
In immunology, viral infections often lead to generation
of a large population of virus-specific effector CD8 T cells,
and following clearance of the infection, there is formation
of memory CD8 T cells (Ahmed and Gray, 1996; Kaech and
Cui, 2012). However, how memory CD8 T cells are formed
during the infection has been a subject of a debate (Ahmed
and Gray, 1996). One of the earlier models assumed that
memory precursors proliferate during the infection and produce
terminally differentiated, nondividing effector T cells, which
then die following clearance of the infection (Wodarz et al.,
2000; Bocharov et al., 2001; Wodarz and Nowak, 2002; Fearon
et al., 2006). While this model was used to explain several
biological phenomena, later studies have shown that this model
failed to accurately explain experimental data on the dynamics
of CD8 T cell response to lymphocytic choriomengitis virus
(Antia et al., 2005; Ganusov, 2007). More precisely, the model
was able to accurately fit experimental data but it required
unphysiologically rapid interdivision time for activated CD8 T
cells [e.g., 25min inGanusov (2007)] whichwas inconsistent with
othermeasurements made to date. Constraining the interdivision
time to a larger value (e.g., 3 h) resulted in a poor model fit
of the data. Therefore, development of adequate mathematical
models cannot be all based on “basic principles” andmust include
comparison with quantitative experimental data.
These examples illustrate how mathematical modeling can
teach us about mechanisms underlying biological processes.
When a model is developed using some basic biological
assumptions/mechanisms and yet such a model is unable
to accurately describe quantitative biological data, we learn
something. We learn that the mechanisms that we thought
should be important in explaining the phenomenon are incorrect
(or that we modeled them incorrectly). In this case, modeling
provides important information that some aspects of biology
that we thought we knew we actually do not know. In the case
of memory CD8 T cell differentiation, the poor assumption
was that effector T cells do not proliferate (Ganusov, 2007).
An alternative situation is when it is believed that only one
mechanism explains a biological phenomenon, and yet several
different models can be formulated and all models are able to
accurately describe experimental data. Again, such a result would
illustrate that specific data can be explained by more than one
mechanism and additional experiments are needed to further
discriminate between alternative models. Although this has not
been formally done, two alternative mechanisms (predator-prey
and seasonality) may be reasonable explanations of the hare-lynx
dynamics in Canada.
2. STRONG INFERENCE IN
MATHEMATICAL MODELING
Strong inference was proposed over 50 years ago to promote
rapid science (Platt, 1964). Platt suggested that despite
a commonly spread “. . . polite fiction that all science is
equal. . . some areas of science progress faster than others” (Platt,
1964). Platt (1964) proposed that by choosing well formulated
questions and hypotheses and by designing discriminatory
experiments, one can progress faster with understanding of
the underlying phenomena. According to strong inference, the
following steps must be taken to investigate a given scientific
question (Platt, 1964):
1. Devising alternative hypotheses;
2. Devising a crucial experiment (or several of them), with
alternative possible outcomes, each of which will, as nearly
as possible, exclude one or more of the hypotheses;
3. Carrying out the experiment so as to get a clean result;
1’. Recycling the procedure, making subhypotheses or sequential
hypotheses to refine the possibilities that remain; and so on.
These recommendations were highly influential as judged by the
number of citation (1439 in Web of Science or 2867 in Google
scholar as of April 5th, 2016); however, it does not appear that
they have been widely adopted in biological sciences (Jewett,
2005). Two major points of these recommendations include (1)
formulation of a set of alternative hypotheses and (2) attempt to
reject, not to confirm, these hypotheses. The idea of formulating
multiple hypotheses goes back to another important paper on
“The method of multiple working hypotheses” (Chamberlin,
1890) which recently received an update (Elliott and Brook,
2007). The idea of testing hypotheses to reject them goes back
to Karl Popper, who proposed that falsification of hypotheses is
the core of the scientific method (Popper, 2002). Strong inference
received its share of criticism suggesting that it cannot be applied
in some areas of research and that it does not promote rapid
science (O’Donohue and Buchanan, 2001). Indeed, testing n > 1
multiple hypotheses is unlikely to provide rapid progress because
it would probably take n times longer to find the answer as
compared to that if there were only one hypothesis to start
with. However, strong inference will likely result in more robust
results than results based on a single hypothesis, and therefore,
overall, multiple hypotheses-driven research provides more rapid
progress for the field as it cuts out early wrong leads. One
author suggested that the use of strong inference may occur
more frequently in industry than in academia due to a higher
focus of industrial research on robustness rather than novelty
(Ehlers, 2016). Robust conclusions rather than novel results are
also viewed as a feature of good scientists both by general public
and professional researchers (Ebersole et al., 2016).
In my view, not all mathematical modeling studies are equal
and some provide better insights into biological mechanisms
than others. By extending Platt’s ideas to mathematical
modeling I propose the following steps for “strong inference in
mathematical modeling” in biology:
1. For a given biological question and associated experimental
data, formulate several alternative mathematical models
aimed at explaining the data;
2. Compare model predictions with experimental data with
the goal of excluding as many of the alternative models as
possible;
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3. For the rejected models, determine reasons why the models
were not able to accurately describe the data;
4. For the models that are consistent with the data, generate
predictions for experiments which would allow one to
discriminate between these alternative models;
1’. As new data are available, recycle the procedure by making
sub-models, alternative models, and so on.
To avoid misinterpretation two issues must be explained further:
what different models are and what it means to reject a model.
There are two levels at which alternative models can be
defined. One is the basic/core mechanism of the mathematical
model and another is specific model formulations within such
a core mechanism. Using hare-lynx dynamics as an example,
two core mechanisms could include predator-prey interactions
or season-driven dynamics. (Perhaps the reader already came
up with a third core mechanism?) Using a given specific core
mechanism one now can write different formulations of the
model, for example, how predator consumes the prey and how
the prey biomass translates into predator biomass. Multiple
formulations are possible and these all are alternativemodels, and
yet they all have the same basic core mechanism. In essence, the
model core is an equivalent of the main hypothesis responsible
for the observed phenomenon. Similarly, seasonality can enter
the model directly assuming time-dependent birth/death rates
of hares and lynx or indirectly by assuming time-dependent
variability in resources. These formulations also can be viewed
as alternative models. Rejection of a specific mathematical model
does not necessarily invalidate the core mechanism but rejection
of a set of alternative models based on a given core mechanism
will raise doubts whether such a core mechanism is responsible
for the observed phenomenon. The best use of strong inference
is a rejection of a core mechanism.
Criteria of model rejection are not well established and
rejection can be done on absolute or relative grounds. When
comparingmodel predictions and data one could ask if themodel
is adequately describing the data. Two tests could be of particular
importance such as goodness of fit test and lack of fit test (Bates
andWatts, 1988). These tests require data with sufficient richness
but in some cases, incompatibility betweenmodel and data can be
determined (Noecker et al., 2015).When using a set of alternative
models other tests such as likelihood ratio test or information
criteria (AIC, BIC, etc.) can be also used (Bates and Watts, 1988;
Burnham and Anderson, 2002; Johnson and Omland, 2004) to
determine which of the models are less likely to be consistent
with the data. Similarly, comparison with data may allow to
reject a core mechanism or more commonly, reject specific
formulations of the core mechanism. Issues associated with
identifiability of mathematical models and precise estimation of
model parameters in some case may not allow to reject specific
models (Meshkat et al., 2009; Raue et al., 2009).
Proper application of strong inference in mathematical
modeling depends critically on choosing a “good” question
which has only a limited number of possible core mechanisms.
It is clear that “big” fundamental questions often have many
potential answers (O’Donohue and Buchanan, 2001) and from
the perspective of strong inference, big questions can rarely be
exhaustively explored. As continuous application of the method
of multiple working hypotheses “develops a habit of parallel or
complex thought” (Chamberlin, 1890), continuous application
of strong inference allows development of a skill of asking
the “good” questions and recognition when asked questions
are “bad.”
As the method of multiple working hypotheses has a “danger
of vacillation” (Chamberlin, 1890), strong inference may fail
when none of the alternative models can be rejected. In fact, it
has been argued that inability to reject hypotheses/models may
be a feature of ecological studies (Hobbs and Hilborn, 2006). One
proposed solution is to use model averaging where predictions of
different models are “weighted” based on the models’ consistency
with experimental data (Hoeting et al., 1999; Burnham and
Anderson, 2002). Model averaging is not without problems,
however, including situations where alternative models generate
contradictory predictions (Grueber et al., 2011). In my view,
inability to apply principles of strong inference to reject some of
the alternative models indicates two potential problems: (1) the
data are poor and insufficient to discriminate between alternative
models (so more and better data need to be collected), and
(2) the formulated question is “bad” (so a better formulated
question is needed).
One useful example of the use of strong inference comes
from the analysis of movement patterns of activated CD8 T cells
in murine brains (Harris et al., 2012). Using intravital imaging
the authors recorded coordinates of T cells in the brain over
long periods of time. By comparing predictions of multiple
mathematical models the authors concluded that only one in
the list of several alternative models, based on generalized Levy
walks, could explain all data with reasonable quality (Harris et al.,
2012). Future studies utilizing further strong inference would
need to discriminate between cell-intrinsic vs. environment-
driven core mechanisms explaining this type of walk of T cells
in the brain.
With principles of strong inference the power of mathematical
modeling can be truly revealing. Closer collaborations between
experimentalists andmodelers leading to discrimination between
alternative models using data would likely result in substantial
robust gains in our understanding of biological processes.
3. DANGERS OF SINGLE
HYPOTHESIS/MODEL-DRIVEN RESEARCH
While scientific benefits of multiple hypotheses/models-driven
research are hard to deny, dangers of using single hypotheses
in research have not been widely emphasized. Already in
1890, Chamberlin (1890) warned about biases resulting from
“dominant theory” or “single hypothesis”-driven research and
why thinking in terms of multiple hypotheses must extend
beyond science and be common practice for everyone in
the world. I would like to present three examples, in which
single hypothesis/mathematical model-driven research limits
and sometimes biases our understanding of biology. These
examples represent my hypothesis on limited robustness of single
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mathematical model-based studies; this hypothesis will have to be
tested and perhaps rejected in the future.
3.1. Biased Predictions
One of the virtues of mathematical models is often cited their
predictive power. Indeed, mathematical models are used to
make predictions in many areas of science including biology.
The types of models used to make predictions vary in their
complexity from simple, few equations-based models to models
including hundreds of variables. How robust are predictions of
such models? My thesis is that predictions based on a single
mathematical model are unlikely to be robust (De Boer, 2012).
Recently, Evans et al. (2013) questioned whether general, very
simple models are useful in making quantitative predictions
on vital, public-health related issues. The authors argued
that such general models by design are relatively simple and
are aimed at describing as many situations as possible. The
authors also argued that models that are designed for specific
systems and parameterized from specific experimental data,
are likely to be more precise in predictions. Such case-specific
models are thought to be more useful in guiding policies for
control of infectious diseases (Evans et al., 2013). The authors
illustrated their point by discussing the predictions of two
mathematical models on the level of vaccination required to
eradicate rabies in the fox populations in Europe (Anderson
et al., 1981; Eisinger and Thulke, 2008). Evans et al. (2013)
argued that simple, susceptible-infected-recovered mathematical
model overestimated the level of vaccination needed for rabies
eradication (Anderson et al., 1981). Such a simple model
predicted that 70% of foxes had to be vaccinated for efficient
control. A more complex model, including details of the local
spread of the infection from rabid to susceptible foxes, predicted
a lower vaccination level of 60% (Eisinger and Thulke, 2008).
Although such a 10% difference may appear small, Eisinger and
Thulke (2008) suggested that the vaccination campaign based on
the prediction of the simple model may have cost over several
millions of euros more than was needed. The authors concluded
that in order to make public health-related predictions for a
specific biological system, the models should include sufficient
detail about that system so themodel predictions are accurate and
precise (Evans et al., 2013). Thus, predictions of a single model
may not be robust, and in some cases, predicted interventions
may cost more than needed.
Another example comes from early predictions of potential
size of the Ebola virus epidemics in Africa in 2014–2016 (Butler,
2014). Initial studies by considering simple models predicted
devastating impact of the epidemic on human population which
luckily did not occur (Butler, 2014; Pandey et al., 2014). Later
analyses revealed that simplemodels were inadequate by ignoring
potential heterogeneity in behavior which translated into large
variability in transmission efficacy (Drake et al., 2015). Although
there is a consensus that mathematical modeling is needed
to understand biological phenomena including epidemiology
of infectious diseases (Lofgren et al., 2014), non-robust model
predictions which overestimate risks are perhaps even more
harmful than models that underestimate the risks. In fact, good
modeling practice is in general to provide minimal estimates of
the risk. Examples of wrong predictions may fuel unwarranted
public debate on trustworthiness of mathematical models, for
example, predicting climate change. Taken together, studies
that are based on the analysis of a single model are not
expected to produce robust predictions (Oreskes et al., 1994).
Predictive studies illustrating which alternative models have been
considered in the analysis, which models have been rejected
and why, and whether predictions of the remaining models are
self-consistent, will lead to robust predictions and should be
encouraged.
3.2. Unreproducible Science
The great feature of science is its self-correcting nature. Some
theories have persisted for decades but have been shown later
to be incorrect as new ideas and data accumulated. While
exceptions clearly exist and there are still common myths despite
experimental evidence otherwise (Scudellari, 2015), science has
been mostly self-correcting. I would argue that in some cases
consideration of a single hypothesis and failure to consider and
reject alternatives has caused dominance of an eventually wrong
theory. In some cases, self-correction in sciences took long time
with resources wasted and lives affected. One example is on
the development of understanding of motions of planets with
a complete dominance of Ptolemy’s theory of immotile Earth
with Sun and planets moving in circular orbits (Danielson and
Graney, 2014). If Tycho Brahe, one of the major astronomers
collecting data to support Ptolemy’s circular orbits-based theory,
and other scientists at the time considered alternatives of elliptic
circles and movable Earth, perhaps science would progress faster,
reach more robust conclusions, and Bruno and Galileo would
not have suffered (Danielson and Graney, 2014). There is more
recent, perhaps an extreme example of a crime conviction of an
innocent person based on consideration of a single hypothesis
(Nuzzo, 2015).
The common practice of considering a single hypothesis
and collecting data to “prove” it can bias interpretation and
may result in unreproducible results. In recent years it has
been noted by several groups of investigators that many of the
results in biological sciences are unreproducible (Prinz et al.,
2011; Begley and Ellis, 2012; Collaboration, 2015; Freedman
and Gibson, 2015; Freedman et al., 2015). In particular, biotech
company Amgen attempted to reproduce 53 “landmark” papers
from cancer biology and was able to reproduce only 6 (Begley
and Ellis, 2012). Overall, a recent review suggests that at least
50% of reanalyzed studies are unreproducible (Freedman et al.,
2015). If these findings can be extrapolated to the whole field
of biomedical research one study estimates that over $28B are
wasted on unreproducible studies, and half of those expenditures
are suggested to result from inappropriate study design and data
analysis (Freedman et al., 2015).
It remains unknown whether reproducibility of mathematical
modeling-based studies is different from that of science in general
(or biology in particular, Boulesteix et al., 2015). For example,
one recent study could reproduce less than half of bioinformatic
analyses of published microarray gene expression data (Ioannidis
et al., 2009). The definition of reproducibility may be difficult in
general as it may vary by researcher (Goodman et al., 2016). For
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one type of mathematical modeling studies which do not involve
any experimental data we generally expect full reproducibility
if the authors correctly wrote and analyzed their model and/or
appropriately simulated its dynamics. However, programing
errors may still occur. A lower level of reproducibility may
be expected for studies utilizing both mathematical models
and analysis of experimental data. I analyzed a subset of data
from a recent survey by Nature (Baker, 2016) by focusing on
responses by scientists from the field of “Biology” with expertise
in “Bioinformatics and Computational Biology” (n1 = 36) or
“Systems Biology” (n2 = 9, n = n1 + n2 = 45 surveys in total).
I found that computational biologists are at least as skeptical
about the state of reproducibility of studies in their fields as
compared to all scientists surveyed. In particular, computational
biologists believe that on average only 50% of studies in their
field are reproducible (compared to 58% for general population,
Mann-Whitney test, p = 0.02), 27% believe that computational
biology has similar level of reproducibility compared to other
fields (vs. 21% for all scientists, χ2
(1)
= 0.76, p = 0.38), and
73% of computational biologists believe that failure to reproduce
results is the major problem in the field (as compared to 59%
of all scientists surveyed, χ2
(1)
= 3.85, p = 0.05). Interestingly,
20% of computational biologists were told that someone could
not reproduce their work (vs. 18% for all scientists, χ2
(1)
= 0.12,
p = 0.73). Thus, there is a general concern about the level of
reproducibility of mathematical modeling-based studies.
A large number of unreproducible studies is paralleled by a
recent increase in percentage of retracted peer-reviewed papers
(Fang et al., 2012; Grieneisen and Zhang, 2012; Fanelli, 2013;
Castillo, 2014). While increased scrutiny of published papers
may have contributed to the rise in the number of retracted
articles (Fanelli, 2013), the increased competition in research,
especially in biomedical sciences, leading to the “publish-or-
perish” culture is a very like cause for the growing number
of unreproducible studies and retracted papers (Steen et al.,
2013). The number of retracted mathematical modeling-based
papers remains relatively low (a simple search for “mathematical
model” on RetractionWatch.com yielded under ten hits as of
April 5th, 2016).
The need for more robust ways of doing science, including
mathematical modeling, is well recognized (Begley and Ellis,
2012; Fang and Casadevall, 2012). By focusing mathematical
modeling analyses on a single model and by showing
qualitative consistency of the model and data we commit
a cognitive/confirmation bias (Kaptchuk, 2003; Editorial,
2015). Confirmation bias appears to be widespread in the
mathematical modeling literature where consistency of a model
with experimental observations occurs much more frequently
than rejection of models. Even in cases when model predictions
match qualitatively other, potentially independent data, there
is a risk of so-called “therapeutic illusion” (Casarett, 2016),
an inability to recognize that alternative mechanisms, not
included in the model, could explain additional data too.
Several suggestions have been made to improve reproducibility
and robustness of science including use of strong inference
(Nuzzo, 2015), improved trainings (Moher and Altman,
2015), performing blind analyses of the data (MacCoun and
Perlmutter, 2015), the need for independent analyses of the same
data/models by different teams prior to publication (Silberzahn
and Uhlmann, 2015), and standardization of tools (Baker,
2015). There is also a need to reduce overoptimistic reporting
in mathematical modeling-based studies (Boulesteix, 2015) and
reduce uncertainties in predictions of mathematical models (Kirk
et al., 2015). The use of principles of strong inference should
increase robustness of predictions of mathematical models and
in general, should reduce the amount of unreproducible research
in biology.
3.3. Development of Large Models
The formulation and analysis of multiple alternative
mathematical models can clearly increase robustness of
conclusions and improve our ability to make accurate
predictions. Robustness of predictions of mathematical models
for public health-related policies is particularly important. To
avoid the need to formulate multiple alternative models for
a given phenomenon researchers often construct models that
include many of known mechanisms in the biological system of
interest. Such a model is then expected to be able to explain a
large number of different phenomena, and there is a hope that at
some choice of parameters the model behavior will capture true
biological forces at play. Such a model is viewed as useful to make
specific predictions of the impact of interventions on population
dynamics (Bru and Cardona, 2010; Cilfone et al., 2015). This
trend for “systems” view on biological phenomena is becoming
more popular and it is now being questioned whether simple
models which include only a few major details about biological
system are useful in making relevant forecasts (Evans et al.,
2013). One of the major problems of large and complex models
is that by including many mechanisms and details these models
become as complex as phenomena they are trying to explain
precluding detailed understanding of such models. Furthermore,
by including multiple details such large models can rarely if ever
be rejected which essentially makes them unscientific per Karl
Popper (Popper, 2002; Ellis and Silk, 2014).
Large complex models are often compared to data to illustrate
their plausibility. However, with tens to hundreds of parameters
complex models can easily explain one or several datasets. Such
model overfitting of the data should never be viewed as model
confirmation (Oreskes et al., 1994). Only few parameters are
needed to generate complex patterns as famous saying states:
“with four parameters I can fit an elephant, and with five, I can
make him wiggle his trunk” (Mayer et al., 2010; Ditlev et al.,
2013). Development of large, complex models can be useful if
such models show inconsistency of specific mechanisms with sets
of experimental observations. Predictions of large models should
be treated with caution unless it has been established which
alternative models/mechanisms have been rejected during model
development (Oreskes et al., 1994). Iterative process of model
development, testing, and calibration using sufficiently extensive
datasets may result in large mathematical models of robust
predictive power; mathematical models predicting weather are
one good example (Bauer et al., 2015). Yet, even well calibrated
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weather prediction models have reasonable accuracy only for
relatively short-term predictions (Bauer et al., 2015).
4. CHANGING TRAINING IN
MATHEMATICAL BIOLOGY
Given intuitive benefits of multiple models-driven research it
is perhaps strange to realize that it remains quite rare. In part
this is due to widely adopted approach to find models which
explain phenomena. I believe that “the approach to find the right
model” starts very early in education of a mathematical biologist,
probably during undergraduate or early graduate career. Many of
the classical textbooks onmathematical modeling in biology have
a similar theme: (1) identify a biological problem, (2) develop a
mathematical model for the problem; the degree of complexity
of the model should depend on the complexity of the problem
and/or underlying biology, (3) analyze the model; (4) draw
the conclusions from the model behaviors and extrapolate the
conclusions to the actual biological system (Segel, 1984; Mooney
and Swift, 1999; Kot, 2001; Ellner and Guckenheimer, 2006;
Vries et al., 2006; Percus, 2012). In this approach the developed
model is often treated as a very good representation of the actual
biological system and rarely the basic assumptions of the model
are challenged. Education in physics and engineering proceeds
in a similar fashion where complex mathematical models are
derived from basic principles which are accepted to be true
either because of some fundamental experiments or simply
because of intuition. This approach, although being relatively
straightforward, fosters an impression that if one starts with
a good set of assumptions this will lead to a model which
should not be questioned. Experimental data are often brought
as support of the model, and when the model predictions are
consistent with some, often qualitative data, the model appears to
be a strong reflection of the reality (Simberloff, 2007). However,
rarely the basic feature of mathematical models—that predictions
are the direct consequences of the model assumptions—is
investigated thoroughly by identifying model assumptions which
are most critical for the “consistency” between the model and
experimental observations, and which assumptions would allow
the model to “fail” at explaining the data. Furthermore, in
many cases consistency between models and data is indicated by
qualitative or semi-quantitative comparison which does not allow
to investigate in a rigorous sense whether the model is indeed an
accurate enough representation of the data (Jin et al., 1999;Wang
et al., 2015).
While many methods are likely to improve robustness of
mathematical modeling-based (and other scientific) studies, the
widespread use of strong inference is likely to be important
in this endeavor (Nuzzo, 2015). Design of multiple alternative
models forces the researcher to deeply understand the underlying
biological question and not be satisfied with standard answers
that “this is well known” but to require solid experimental
support for major model assumptions. Education of future
generations of students in mathematical modeling should focus
more on deeper understanding of biological details and on
investigating which aspects of their models could be wrong. If we
substitute “theory” with “model,” it was very nicely said by Ellis
and Silk (2014) that research often “boils down to clarifying one
question: what potential observational or experimental evidence
is there that would persuade you that the theory is wrong and lead
you to abandoning it? If there is none, it is not a scientific theory.”
Finding boundaries when the model “breaks” at explaining the
phenomenon in question would reveal limitations of the model
and of its predictions. Therefore, future mathematical modelers
should be able to understand details of biological experiments, how
the data are collected and analyzed, so such data are used with
most efficiency for model development and testing. Such training
thus must extend beyond traditional education in mathematics,
engineering, and computer science.
One of the major difficulties with multiple models-driven
research and strong inference is to identify the number of
alternative models/hypotheses one needs to consider to satisfy
principles of strong inference (Platt, 1964). Choosing a “good”
question is key in this process. Wise application of strong
inference requires selection of “good” questions for which only
a limited number of alternative hypotheses (or core mechanisms)
exist (Platt, 1964). Choosing the “good” question is an endeavor
and skill on its own; it is a part of scientific method and it requires
specific training. Education in mathematical modeling should
focus more on developing skills on identifying biological problems
which have a limited number of possible answers and which can be
addressed using mathematical modeling. For example, if one finds
too many alternative explanations for his/her question, perhaps
he/she is not asking a “good” question. In practice, consideration
of two or more models would be likely to be better than study
with a single model, and formulation and analysis of models
with alternative core mechanisms is most preferable per strong
inference.
It has to be realized that predictions of any single model
for a biological system are not likely to be robust due to
inherent openness of biological systems (Oreskes et al., 1994).
Therefore, any single model is very limited in its use. However,
a collection of alternative models is more likely to generate
robust predictions; alternatively, analysis of such models could
suggest inability to make robust predictions due to lack of
appropriate data to reject alternative models. In this case, such
multiple models-driven analysis may suggest areas for further
experimental investigations. The idea of limited robustness of
mathematical models in describing biological phenomena needs
to be percolated in educational curriculum of undergraduate
and graduate students, and this notion needs to be more widely
stated in the professional modeling community. Realization that
for every biological problem there are likely several alternative
mechanisms/models needs to be eventually translated in research
where it is not acceptable anymore to have a publication with only
one mathematical model analyzed. We need to see mathematical
biology research to move to the stage where in most publications
the authors propose multiple models and discriminate between
these models using quantitative biological data. Education of
future generation of mathematical modelers must include training
in building of alternative mathematical models and in techniques
to discriminate between alternative models using experimental
data (Burnham and Anderson, 2002; Johnson and Omland,
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2004). When presented with results from a mathematical
modeling-based study we should always ask the question
(adapted from Platt, 1964): “But Sir/Madam, whichmathematical
models/mechanisms have you rejected in your study?”
Training of a new generation of scientists in mathematical
biology should involve more reading and discussion of the basics
of scientific method. Three papers are of particular importance
and they should form the core of the graduate curriculum in
graduate schools and specifically, of programs on mathematical
modeling (Chamberlin, 1890; Platt, 1964; Oreskes et al., 1994).
While I have discussed the ideas of the papers by Chamberlin
(1890) and Platt (1964), an essay by Oreskes et al. (1994)
clearly defined usefulness and limitations of mathematical
modeling of open natural systems. In particular, the authors
strongly cautioned against use of the words “verification” and
“validation” to indicate “quality” of mathematical models as these
terms exaggerate the limited ability of models to make robust
predictions. In fact, “verification” of models is impossible per
word definition due to the openness of natural systems, and
in most cases the use of the word “validation” is synonymous
to “verification” and thus is also inappropriate. The authors
discussed in detail why verification/validations of models (or
any logical statement) is impossible in natural sciences, and
highlighted many philosophical developments on the nature of
scientific method in the early Twentieth Century that is rarely
discussed in graduate programs nowadays.
An important component of learning about mathematical
modeling in biology is a realization that good modeling requires
good understanding of the developed mathematical models.
When does one understand the model, in a true sense of
understanding? I believe that for simple models with a few
parameters, true understanding is realized when one intuitively
can predict the impact of the change in a model parameter or
a combination of parameters on the model dynamics. Such an
detailed understanding of the model also allows for insights in
situations when the model is not able to fit/describe experimental
data—i.e., why isn’t the model able to explain experimental
data? What is wrong with it? Deeper understanding of the
model can point to parts of the model that are responsible
for such discrepancy. Intuitive understanding of the model is
very difficult or impossible for models with tens to hundreds
of parameters. Yet, such an understanding is needed if the
model fails to explain well some experimental data. How can
one understand such a model? The traditional approach for
understanding complex models is sensitivity analysis (Marino
and Kirschner, 2004). Sensitivity analysis can allow to rank
parameters of the model or the combination of parameters in
terms of their impact on behavior of specific model components,
e.g., density of species at some time point. I would argue,
however, that in many cases sensitivity analyses do not give a
good understanding of the model behavior because answers may
depend on the method used and because sensitivity analysis
often does not specify why this and not another parameter is
the most important in the model dynamics. However, analyses
which provide rational explanations of why specific parameters
or parameter combinations drive model dynamics will likely
reveal relative importance of different biological mechanisms.
Education of future mathematical modelers should include basics
of sensitivity analyses and understanding when such analyses are
informative and when they are not.
5. CONCLUSIONS
A simple and effective critique of multiple hypotheses/models-
driven research is to make counter examples of studies utilizing
a single mathematical model and yet providing important
biological insights. For instance, very well known studies utilizing
a single ODE-based mathematical model estimated the rate of
turnover of HIV and HIV-infected cells (Ho et al., 1995; Wei
et al., 1995). Although the success of this pioneering work to
accurately estimate the life-span of infected cells is well known,
the failure of the model to accurately predict turnover of CD4
T cells due to incorrect assumption of CD4 T cell recovery due
to production of new T cells is rarely acknowledged (Ho et al.,
1995; Pabst and Rosenberg, 1998; Bucy et al., 1999). Furthermore,
because we tend to remember “winners” and forget “losers,”
it is very likely that many predictions of single mathematical
modeling-based studies are incorrect or not robust to changes in
the model assumption. It would be useful to generate data on the
frequency of “correct" vs. “incorrect” predictions of studies based
on single vs. multiple mathematical models although it may be
difficult to define “correctness” of predictions.
Even in the absence of such data I propose that in order for
mathematical modeling to become more robust, more practical
and relevant for infectious disease biology we, mathematical
modelers, need to re-think how we do research and how we
train new generations of students. It is possible that the current
format in which students, taking mathematical modeling in
biology courses, get exposed to sets of standard models and
their properties needs to be changed to observation-driven
training where students develop models to explain particular
experimental observations. Basic biological principles can be
used to drive the development of models with variable levels of
complexity and models the alternative mechanisms. Comparison
to quantitative experimental data then can be used to test which
of the models (i.e., mechanisms) are not consistent with the data
and why (Popper, 2002).
Given that mathematical models are increasingly playing
an important role in policy decision making (Christley et al.,
2013), it is the time to change the way many mathematicians
approach modeling, and we need to change the way we teach
mathematical modeling at universities. Devising as many as
possible alternative models for every biological question and
comparing model predictions with quantitative experimental
data to reject the models will allow mathematical modeling
to become a scientific procedure generating more robust
predictions.
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